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The use of market based mechanisms such as Clean Development Mechanism1 under the 
Kyoto Protocol has increasingly become a common approach to address environmental 
challenges. Putting a price tag on the environment helps people realise the real costs of 
damages which are otherwise ignored and thereby lead people to change their behaviour. It 
also helps reduce the costs of reducing emission and meeting environmental goals by creating 
a market and improving efficiency. In addition, introducing market based mechanisms may 
help mobilise funds for tackling various environmental challenges. In an effort to protect 
biodiversity, for example, the use of innovative mechanisms including biodiversity offsets 
and Payment for Ecosystem Services have been explored following the decision to develop 
such financial mechanisms at the 9th Conference of Parties for the Biodiversity Convention 
in 20092.   
 
The use of market based mechanism is transforming the way nature and ecosystems are 
managed with profound impacts on the livelihoods of people dependent on them. This is 
particularly the case in the application of REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and forest Degradation), an emerging approach to address climate change, because of its 
potential impacts on the local community it may create. The paper, based on Indonesia’s 
experience to date, analyses the environmental justice implications of REDD and discusses 
issues that need to be taken into account for the design of an equitable and sustainable REDD 
scheme.  
 
The emergence of REDD  
Greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation account for about 17%3 
of the total emissions worldwide (IPCC 2007). This makes the sector one of key targets for 
emission reductions in an effort to address climate change. In the Copenhagen Accord which 
was “taken note of” at the United Nations climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December 
2009, the international community recognised “the crucial role of reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation and the need to enhance removals of greenhouse gas 
emissions by forests” and agreed on the need to provide positive incentives for REDD+ 
(Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation plus 4 ). Detailed and 
                                                  
1
 CDM is one of the "flexibility" mechanisms defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
2
 CBD/ COP/DEC/IX/11B 
3
 The new study, based on updated forest cover data and accounting for significantly increased fossil fuel 
emissions, puts the figure at 12%, although the authors, led by Guido van der Werf of Vrije Universiteit in 
Amsterdam, note that the percentage is highly variable on a year-to-year basis. 
4
 REDD+ is a mechanism that establishes incentives for developing countries to protect and better manage 
their forest resources, by creating a financial value for the carbon stored in trees, thus making forests more 
valuable standing than cut down. REDD“+” goes beyond deforestation and forest degradation, and 
includes the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon 
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standardised framework with regards to how to design and implement REDD and monitor, 
report and verify emission reductions from REDD is still being developed. In the meantime, a 
number of developing countries have started pilot implementation of REDD with the support 
of donors and NGOs. UN REDD programme5, for example, supports REDD+ readiness 
activities in nine pilot countries6 and has approved over US$42 million to date.  
 
The potential financial streams REDD are expected to generate over coming years attract 
international investors. Merrill Lynch and Macquarie Bank are seeing REDD as “the new 
black”, and have already put money into projects in Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and 
Cambodia7. Tradable carbon credits from trees could help improve the livelihood of local 
communities while creating a financial incentive to preserve forests. As often seen in the case 
of decentralisation of natural resources management, however, implementing REDD in the 
absence of sound governance creates a political vacuum vulnerable to elite capture, 
manipulation and other interventions by politically powerful groups. The political battle over 
resource rent may also lead to a suboptimal outcome for most stakeholders. Given the scale 
of benefits and the limited transparency and accountability on the ground in countries 
promoting REDD, the REDD activities are fraught with risks. Serious violations of 
indigenous people’s rights have already been reported in Papua New Guinea8 which led to 
the Indigenous Environmental Network to reject completely REDD and REDD+ as a means 
of addressing climate change (IEN, 2010).  
 
The current debate on REDD tends to focus on MRV (measurement, reporting and 
verification) issues. It is understandable given the importance of baseline data for any 
transactions. However, the other side of REDD – its potential to affect internal community 
dynamics as well as the way forest is managed at the local level is equally important and 
should not be overlooked. For REDD to meet its alleged objectives of reducing emissions and 
poverty at the same time, social and political changes that might arise with the introduction of 
REDD and potential reactions of different actors to these changes must be fully considered in 
advance. This requires a careful analysis of the history of forest management in a 
country/region in question. This will help identify potential risks associated with REDD, 
                                                                                                                                                          
stocks. 
5
 UN REDD Programme, http://www.un-redd.org/  
6
 Bolivia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Indonesia, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 
United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam and Zambia. 
7
 Merrill Lynch is to invest $9 million to the Ulu Masen Project to protect 750,000 hectares of forest in 
Aceh, Indonesia. 
8
 IEN Press Release (January 13, 2010), “Indigenous leader kidnapped and forced at gunpoint to surrender 
carbon rights for REDD in Papua New Guinea”, 
http://www.ienearth.org/docs/IENPressRelease-Carbon-Trading-violates-Indigenous-Peolpes-rights-1-13-2
010.pdf  
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which will be critical for designing an equitable REDD framework. What follows is a brief 
description of the forest management in Indonesia, one of the pilot countries of UN REDD 
Programme, and the analysis of the socio-political changes over time based on the Six 
Moment Framework proposed by David Harvey (See Box 1).  
 





























Forestry in Indonesia – a pendulum between decentralised and centralised control 
During the New Order Regime under President Suharto from 1966 to 1998, Ministry of 
Forestry had virtually full authority in the management of forest resources in the country. The 
role of Provincial and district governments were generally limited to implementing decisions 
David Harvey (1996: 78) proposed six moments as a basic framework to better understand 
social processes of change, namely: discourse; power; values and beliefs; social relations; 
material practices; and institutions and rituals. These moments are interdependent as each 
moment is influenced by effects from other moments. In other words, interactions within 
each moment have important implications in the changes in other moments. Differences in 
people’s values and beliefs are, for example, are partly the result of different degree of 
power and/or the different social relations they have, and vice versa. As such, the six 
moments should not be understood as mutually exclusive stages of social changes. Rather, 
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made in Jakarta9. There was hardly any space for local communities, particularly those of 
indigenous ones, to claim their rights to forest. Although the national slogan, Bhinneka 
Tunggal Ika, unity in diversity, considers ethnic diversity as an asset, a strong emphasis was 
placed on unity and many efforts were made to limit the expression of ethnic identity. The 
emphasis on unity is reflected on the Suharto policy of deactivating so called SARA (Suku, 
Agama, Ras dan Antar Golongan, meaning ethnic group, religion, race and group-based 
interest) in institutions and socio-political interactions.  
 
In other words, interaction of six moments during this period led a moment to ‘catalyse’ into 
what Harvey calls “permanence” or rigid structures that favour those in power in Jakarta. 
Harvey correctly recognises the possibility of interactions flowing in a causal or circular 
manner, especially in a way that serves to the interests of powerful groups. The central 
government had a sole authority to grant logging concessions. The centralised regime was 
justified to ensure the national unity and achieve economic development. Voices for the rights 
of indigenous people were dismissed as romantics imposing their primitive fantasies upon 
poor folk who want, or should want, to progress like “ordinary” Indonesians (Li, 2000). 
Unified educational system also played a role in reinforcing the centralised and nationalistic 
value systems. Only a few religions were officially recognised, namely Islam, Protestantism, 
Catholicism, Buddhism and Hinduism, and communities were encouraged to abandon their 
traditional beliefs. 
 
What Foucault described in Discipline and Punish might be a good description of the period 
of centralised control which lasted more than three decades. For Foucault (1977), the 
presence and the use of discourse are intrinsically connected to the exercise of power. In 
Discipline and Punish, Foucault analysed power within every social relationship and showed 
how human beings are socially constructed to be an obedient actor in the society. Under the 
surveillance of Panopticon, individuals will choose to become disciplined and obedient 
selves at their own will. In other words, individuals are defined and created by the pervasive 
power in the society. This is a view in which the idea of an autonomous individual has no 
place because any subjective behaviour of individuals is merely a result or creation of power. 
Foucault identified and analysed the mechanisms (dispositifs) in which power is pervasive 
and suffuses every aspect of social life. As Buchanan points out, Foucault’s analysis 
privileges the productive apparatus which produces the discipline at the expense of the 
productions of the people (2000: 93). This was essentially what happened in the forestry 
sector of Indonesia during the New Order Regime.   
                                                  
9
 It is worthwhile to note that prior to the basic forestry law of 1967, district governments were allowed to 
issue permits for timber and non-timber forest extraction, to levy a tax or taxes on concession permit 
holders. 
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With the end of the New Order Regime, however, the political pendulum swung back in 
favour of the districts and communities. Law 22/1999 on regional administration gave district 
government greater authority to formulate their own policies, including policy in the forest 
sector. Law 25/1999 on fiscal balancing also allocated a larger share of forest revenues to the 
districts and provinces. In 2000, Ministry of Forestry issued a decree (No.05.1/2000) which 
further empowering the district by allowing district authority to issue small-scale concession 
permits. Such permits may be granted to communities, individuals or a registered company, 
and therefore, local communities, which had been denied access to forest resources, were 
believed to gain from the expanded access to forest resources. In reality, however, because of 
the rigid procedures and requirements of the application process, and the capital outlay and 
experience required to manage a concession, most local communities had no choice but to 
hand over responsibility for the permit application process and concession management to 
wealthy companies or contractors. In these cases, companies or contractors would pay the 
communities a share of timber profits and/or provide social benefits such as village 
development, livelihoods opportunities and physical assistance. Due to the lack of clear 
regulatory framework, however, the agreements with regards to the distribution of benefits 
tended to be drawn up in an ad hoc manner with considerable differences. In some cases, as 
Samsu et al. (2005) found in some villages in East Kalimantan, fees were divided equally 
among individuals, with equal allocation given even to babies. In other villages fees were 
divided among households and further divided for main families, new families, widows and 
youths. There were also cases in which fees were reserved solely for village heads and other 
members of the local elite (Yasmi et al. 2005).  
 
In addition, the new sense of entitlement attached to communities made identify of 
community the source of political battle. Communities started to use a variety of arguments 
to secure their share of resource rent. Evidences used range from documents dating from the 
Dutch colonial period to semi-official letters from different government levels to the recalling 
various versions of oral history. “Constructing” history thus became a means of making a 
claim, often resulting in overlapping claims by different groups. Ethnic, historical or 
territorial factors were used to establish identity of so-called adat or traditional communities. 
Many of these factors overlapped and intertwined sometimes, thus leading to conflict over 
which definition is to be accepted, which in turn, determine who would have rightful control 
over natural resources of a particular area. There are strong environmental justice implication 
in this because, for example, claims based on historical presence disadvantaged migratory 
groups including those who moved as part of the government resettlement schemes during 
the New Order Regime.  
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Reforms empowered adat and made adat visible. A space was created for local communities 
to openly contest the ownership of the state and regain their adat rights (Simarmata and 
Masiun, 2002). Decentralisation and expanded opportunities for district and local 
stakeholders to participate in decision-making processes was believed to empower local 
communities and improve equity through greater retention and fair or democratic distribution 
of benefits accrued from forests. As observed in many developing countries, however, 
decentralisation in Indonesia did not lead to a more equitable or sustainable forest 
management10. Rather, it became yet another example of how a socio-political change creates 
a political vacuum that is extremely vulnerable to manipulations. In particular, 
decentralisation triggered two types of conflicts over access to resources. The first is a 
vertical conflict across different levels of government which try to exert and assume greater 
authority over forest resources. The second is a horizontal conflict across and sometimes 
within communities. The ad hoc manner of establishing a claim to land and resources create 
tensions among community that share forests. A number of research shows that certain village 
elites captured disproportionate share of benefits from timber extracted from communal 
customary forests (Palmer 2004; Samsu et al. 2005; Tokede et al. 2005). 
 
REDD in Indonesia is being prepared and piloted under such conditions. Distribution of 
benefits from carbon credits accrued from REDD will be a source of both vertical and 
horizontal tensions. The Government of Indonesia announced the revenue sharing of REDD 
in concession areas as follows: 60% for contractor; 20% for Government (of those, Central 
Government and District Government take 40% each and Provincial Government takes the 
remaining 20% ); and 20% for community. This distribution scheme, however, potentially 
conflicts with other rules. For example, the province of Aceh, which started a pilot REDD 
project (Ulu Masen Project to which Merrill Lynch is investing $9 million) before the central 
Government announced the above revenue sharing rule, is allowed to take 80% of revenues 
accrued from forest resources because of its special autonomous status. The specific rules for 
REDD revenue sharing does not exist today, but distribution of benefits is certainly a major 
source of vertical tensions associated with REDD. Horizontally, REDD will have 
significantly varying impact to local community depending on their dependence on forests 
and forest-related products. The requirement to preserve forests as carbon sink will affect 
communities with high degree of dependence more than communities that have alternative 
means of livelihoods other than logging and swidden agriculture. In addition, communities 
participating in REDD may be exposed to a different kind of risks, namely volatility in the 
carbon market. Reliance on cash revenues from REDD is potentially quite vulnerable to the 
fluctuation of the carbon market. Given the significant uncertainty over the structure of the 
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 For discussions of mixed result of decentralisation, see, for example, Ribot (2002) and Leach (2002). 
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post 2012 carbon regime, this cannot be ignored.  
 
 
Bricolage as a challenge to “permanence” 
Providing the scale of benefits envisaged and limited transparency and accountability on the 
ground, the introduction of REDD may lead to another state of “permanence” where local 
and marginalised groups are deprived of meaningful benefits. The concept of bricolage may 
offer a useful starting point for developing an alternative pathway. Michel de Certeau (1984) 
analysed subtle movements of escape and evasion by actors and explained how actors could, 
though constrained by pervasive power, exercise considerable agency with two concepts: 
strategy and tactics. De Certeau defines strategy as follows: 
 
“I call a strategy the calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that 
becomes possible as soon as a subject with will and power (a business, an army, a 
city, a scientific institution) can be isolated. It postulates a place that can be 
delimited as its own and serve as the base from which relations with an exteriority 
composed of targets or threats (customers or competitors, enemies, the country 
surrounding the city, objective and objects of research, etc.) can be managed”. (de 
Certeau, 1984: 35-6)  
 
In Foucault's analogy, strategy is an act of someone who takes the central position of the 
panopticon with the power to observe the entire space. On the other hand: 
 
“A tactic is a calculation determined by the absence of a proper locus. No 
delimitation of an exteriority, then, provides it with the condition necessary for 
autonomy. The space of the tactic is the space of the other”. (ibid, 1984: 35-6)  
 
De Certeau calls this exercise ‘bricolage’. Through his study of the practice of everyday life, 
de Certeau argued that even seemingly marginalised groups have some agency to make do in 
an imposed condition through bricolage. De Certeau finds an example of the exercise of 
bricolage in the way in which Indians subverted the culture of their Spanish colonisers. In 
other words, de Certer interprets bricolage as a tactical act of marginalised groups.  
 
The concept of bricolage is closely associated with the notion of the art of making usage of 
whatever at hand (Lèvi-Strauss, 1968). Orr (1990: 184-185) emphasised the importance of 
“community memory” in connecting socially distributed knowledge and saw the notion of 
bricolage as important in this, in terms of the “reflective manipulation of a set of resources 
accumulated through experience” and the “piecing together an understanding from bits of 
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experience, their own or others’, in the absence of definitive information.” As discussed 
above, interaction of six moments tend to favour those in power, but the exercise of bricolage 
may serve as a bottom-up feedback in the interaction of six moments that could pave a way 
for a more equitable social change. Foucault might say that there is no or little room for these 
marginalised groups to exercise any agency and change or to subvert an imposed order. 
However, de Certeau argues that there is room for them to act which he finds in the practice 
of everyday life: “They metaphorized the dominant order… they diverted it without leaving 
it” (de Certeau, 1988: 32). For this to take place, however, one should avoid a romantic view 
of community that is peaceful and homogeneous. In reality, internal dynamics within the 
community is quite complex and the lack of awareness to this complexity can easily force 
any reform susceptible to strategic manipulations. Any efforts to support a more equitable and 




The implementation of REDD in Indonesia and elsewhere is still in an early stage and how 
REDD could affect internal community dynamics remains to be seen. The discussion so far, 
however, tends to focus on accounting issues (measurement, reporting and verification of 
emissions), and there is little debate on the possible implications for the community or the 
other way around. If only parts of the community benefit from REDD and others do not, new 
tensions can develop. Similarly, distribution of REDD benefits across different levels of 
government could also intensify the political battle over resource rent. What happened in the 
decentralisation process in the late 1990s to the early 2000s highlights the degree of 
vulnerability in which small powerful groups capture the majority of the benefits is high. 
Bricolage appears to offer an interesting alternative to status quo and may serve as a tactical 
weapon of the weak to challenge the dominant order. 
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